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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bowers-Irons asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing its claim for construction damages within the easement, and
its claim that cattle guards were necessary

to restore the

fences

their

as

condition.

close

as

reasonably

possible

to

original

These claims are for breach of IPA's obligation to

cause as least damage to the burdened property as possible, and
to restore the property to its original condition so far as
reasonably possible.

Although these claims normally would not

be part of a condemnation suit, IPA implicitly consented to the
trial of those issues in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
BOWERS-IRONS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR
CONSTRUCTION DAMAGES WITHIN THE EASEMENT.
Two sub-issues are presented by this appeal concerning the
issue

of

whether

Bowers-Irons

was

entitled

construction damages within the easement:

to

recover

for

(1) Were construction

damages within the easement included within by the condemnation
award, and

(2) if not, was Bowers-Irons entitled to recover

those construction damages in this action.

The argument below

and in appellant's opening brief demonstrates that Utah cases
establish that construction damages are not contemplated by nor
included

in a

condemnation

award.

Although

an

action

for

recovery of construction damages may be brought as a separate
action, IPA implicitly consented to the issue being tried in
this action.
A.

The Condemnation Award Did Not Include Construction

Damages.
IPA

asserts

in

its

Summary

of

Argument

that

allowing

Bowers-Irons to recover for construction damages would result in
a double recovery.

The cases and argument cited in Point I of

IPA's brief, however, with one exception, establish only that
recovery for construction damages is not generally part of a
condemnation proceeding

and

award.

this

Logic

compels

is not part of the condemnation
conclusion.

The

purpose

of a

condemnation award is to compensate the land owner for the fair
market value of the land as of the date of the taking.
2

The

construction damages usually do not come into existence until
after the taking, and clearly cannot be included as part of the
condemnation award.

To hold otherwise would be to hold that an

owner of an easement has no restriction whatsoever on the amount
of damage which can be done to the burdened property and has no
obligation to restore the burdened property to its original
condition.

The effect of such a holding would be to grant the

easement owner the equivalent of fee simple title while only
requiring payment for an easement.
The cases cited by appellant in its opening brief establish
that an easement owner has an obligation to cause the least
possible damage and to return the premises to its original
condition so far as reasonably possible.

An easement owner

which fails to do so may be held liable for damages.

An award

of such damages does not result in a double recovery.
None of the Utah cases cited by IPA refute this rule, and
in fact support it.

IPA claims, however, that the Colorado case

of Western Slope Gas Co. v. Lake Eldora Corp.. 521 P.2d 641
(Colo. App. 1973) , holds that construction damage to the land
within the right of way is not separately compensable but is a
factor taken into account in the initial determination of the
value of the right of way.

A careful reading of that case

indicates that it does not hold that recovery cannot be had for
construction damages, but only holds that the initial condemnation award is not based on the cost of restoring the land to its

3

initial condition, but rather on the diminution in market value
by reason of the taking.
As set forth above, to hold that the anticipated construction damages are included within the initial condemnation award
is contrary to reason, because the extent

of those damages

cannot be known as of the date of the taking and frequently will
not be known as of the date the award is made.

To the extent

that Western Slope does support a rule as advocated by IPA, it
should be rejected by this Court.

This Court should not espouse

a rule which holds that an owner of an easement has no obligation to cause the least possible damage to the property nor to
return the property to its original condition so far as reasonably possible.
B.

IPA Implicitly Consented to the Trial of the Construc-

tion Damage Issues in this Lawsuit.
The discussion above establishes that an easement owner has
an obligation to restore the land to its original condition
insofar as reasonably possible, and may be held
damages if it fails to do so.

liable for

Although such an action for

damages is normally separate from the condemnation action, the
record in this case establishes that IPA implicitly consented
that those issues be tried in this action.

Indeed, the parties

stipulated to a settlement of the condemnation portion of the
action and reserved for trial only the issue of "incidental"
damages.

4

The fact that IPA implicitly consented to trial, in this
case, of the issue of construction damages is evidenced by IPA's
stipulation to an award of construction damages outside the
easement.

No logical or statutory distinction exists between

construction damages within the easement or without the easement, as is established below.

The distinction between the two

was raised for the first time at the trial of this matter.
IPA claims that recovery for construction damages outside
the easement is included under Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(3)
(1987).

That section holds that the fact finder in a condemna-

tion proceeding must ascertain and assess "if the property,
though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the construction
damages."

of

the

proposed

improvement,

the

amount

of

such

Although this section authorizes compensation

for

damages caused by construction, those damages are not the same
as the "construction damages" as used by the parties in this
action.
Appellant

has

discovered

only

three

specifically cite section 78-34-10(3).

Utah

cases

which

Board of Education of

Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P.2d
697

(1962); State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76

(1961); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d
693 (1960) .

It is clear from a reading of these cases that

Section 78-34-10(3) refers to a type of severance damages caused
by a taking.

"Typical" severance damages are provided for in

Section 78-34-10(2), which provides for severance damages where
5

"the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of
a larger parcel.11

The severance damages contemplated by 78-34-

10(3), in contrast, are those which occurred to other lands
owned by the property owner.

In Southern Pacific Co. , for

example, the Court found that other parcels of property owned by
the defendants were less useful as range land as a result of the
taking of the condemned parcel of land.

352 P.2d at 697.

In

State v. Peterson, the Court made an award of severance damages
to the

remainder

of the defendant's

support Section 78-34-10(3).

property

and

366 P.2d at 79 n. 5.

cited

as

In Croft,

the Court describes the types of damages which may be covered
under Section 78-34-10(3) as follows:
Damages to land, by the construction of a
public or industrial improvement, though no
part thereof is taken as provided for under
78-34-10(3), contrary to the rule for
severance damages, is limited to injuries
that would be actionable at common law, or
where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public or private,
which the owner enjoys in connection with
his property and which gives it additional
value, and which causes him to sustain a
special damage with respect to his property
in excess of that sustained by the public
generally. It requires a definite physical
injury cognizable to the senses with a
perceptible effect on the present market
value: such as drying up wells and springs,
destroying
lateral
supports,
preventing
surface waters from running off adjacent
lands or running
surface waters
onto
adjacent lands, or the depositing of cinders
and other foreign materials on neighboring
lands by the permanent operation of the
business or improvement established on the
adjoining lands.
373 P.2d at 699-700 (citations omitted).
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As set forth in this example, the types of damages contemplated

by

subsection

78-34-10(3)

are

those

injuries

to

adjoining property which are unavoidably caused by the taking of
the condemned property.

The list of examples does not include

construction damages, either within or without the easement,
caused by the easement owner's negligence*
The Utah case of Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v, Salt Lake City,
87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 405 (1935), illustrates the principle that
construction

damages

outside

the

easement

compensable in a condemnation proceeding.

are

not

normally

The land owner in

that case sued the easement owner to recover damages because of
excavated material left on the land outside the easement.

The

issue presented was whether the case was one in contract or
negligence, as opposed to a case for wrongful taking of land.
The Court held that the case was not one for wrongful taking,
because the damages claimed were not part of a condemnation
case.

Implicit in the decision is the holding that the damages

would be compensable under a breach of contract or a negligence
theory.
In the instant case, therefore, there was no legal reason
to distinguish between damages to Bowers-Iron's land outside the
easement from the damages to the land within the easement.

None

of those damages were included within the condemnation award.
Where IPA consented to the trial in the condemnation action of
those negligence and breach of contract issues, it was error for
the Court to distinguish between the damages which occurred

7

within

the

easement.

easement
The

case

from

those

should

which

be

occurred

remanded

without

for the

taking

the
of

evidence and the entry of judgment for the damages within the
easement.
POINT II
FAILURE TO RESTORE THE FENCES TO THEIR
ORIGINAL CONDITION WAS A SEPARABLY COMPENSABLE ITEM.
The trial court also excluded evidence concerning BowersIrons1 claim that cattle guards were necessary to restore the
fences to their original condition.

As set forth above, IPA had

an obligation to restore the land to its original condition so
far as reasonably possible.

The evidence at trial would have

supported a jury finding that a wire gate was not adequate to
restore the

fences to their original condition,

and that a

cattle guard was required.
For the same reasons as set forth above in Point I, BowersIrons was entitled to recover for IPA's breach of its obligation
to restore the land to its original condition, including the
failure to restore the fences by installing cattle guards.
CONCLUSION
No serious contention can be made that IPA did not have an
obligation to cause as least damage to the property as possible,
and to return the land to its original condition so far as
reasonably possible, and that Bowers-Irons did not have a right
to

recover

damages

by

reason

of

IPA's

failure

to

do

so.

Although the action for damages would normally be separate from
a condemnation

action,

IPA consented
8

to the trial of those

issues in this lawsuit.

The Court erted

in distinguishing

between the construction damages within tne easement from those
without the easement.

The case should be remanded to the trial

court for the taking of evidence and the entry of judgment for
damages within the easement.
DATED this

Z^f

day of December, ]J988.
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